The Richardson Post
The old maxim: “If you wish for peace, prepare for war” has never been more applicable.
And that’s exactly what Taiwan is doing.
With the understanding that the USA may have abandoned its “strategic ambiguity” regarding China and its defense of Taiwan, the latter is now operating under the assumption that an invasion is imminent – most likely this year or 2027.
Taiwan has increased its 2026 defence budget by a staggering 22% year-over-year, which is a record high.
But just as critical as the spending increase is the strategy behind it.
The approach isn’t to spend more on conventional, high-profile systems like massive carriers or heavy tanks that would be sitting ducks in a cross-strait invasion.
Taiwan’s thinking is more pragmatic. It’s investing in more effective and sustainable ‘asymmetric’ defense systems that are designed to make an invasion too costly and chaotic for Beijing to stomach.
Taiwan’s defence strategy against a Chinese invasion is similar to that of Iran’s, which seeks to successfully endure the onslaught of U.S. bombings and missile strikes.
The idea is to make a quick victory improbable, if not impossible, and thereby drag out the war and diminish the attacker’s willingness to wage a long-term war.
We are seeing that right now in Iran.
In essence, in the face of a much more powerful aggressor, anything short of surrender would be considered a victory.
Taiwan knows that it can’t match the firepower or numbers of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). That’s why it’s investing heavily in sea drones, mobile missile units, and unmanned platforms.
Taiwan’s military planners’ intention is to deny the PLA a quick victory, opting instead for an asymmetrical, highly distributed defence that is cheaper to deploy and significantly harder to destroy.
To realize this “porcupine” strategy, the USA is fast-tracking the delivery of Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems (HCDS), which allow Taiwan to strike invading ships from mobile, land-based, hidden positions.
Additionally, the rapid procurement of High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones provides Taiwan with the long-range strike and surveillance capabilities needed to disrupt PLA staging areas before they reach the shore.
The transformation also extends deep into the psyches of Taiwan’s military forces.
The government is moving away from symbolic military displays and parades toward a sharper, more realistic, and high-frequency training regimen.
This change in strategy, personnel preparedness, and mindset is grounded in the ongoing and bloody lessons of Ukraine and the Middle East.
The objective is to make the cost of conventional warfare unacceptable to the PLA.
That’s why recent war games and the annual Han Kuang exercises now prioritize drone integration, layered air defence, and early warning systems over conventional, highly choreographed military manoeuvres that offer few advantages to Taiwan’s military.
The inclusion of National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) – the same defence system that protects Washington, D.C. – is being accelerated to provide Taiwan with a proven, layered defence against incoming cruise missiles and aircraft.
There are two primary drivers of this sudden urgency within the halls of power in Taiwan over a potentially imminent Chinese invasion.
First is the growing concern over American distraction. With the U.S. militarily engaged in the Middle East, Taiwanese officials fear Beijing may see a window of opportunity to strike while the USA is busy elsewhere.
It’s a classic strategic calculation based on the assumption that if the USA is overstretched in the Middle East, then China’s likelihood of a successful invasion of Taiwan would likely improve.
Second is China’s internal conditions. Rising pressures within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), military leadership weakened by continuous purges, and rising domestic unrest can all act as dangerous risk multipliers.
Faced with a declining real estate market, mounting debt, and a discontented populace, Chinese leader Xi Jinping may follow the long history of embattled tyrants and turn towards stoking nationalism and legitimacy through external conflict.
Accordingly, rising numbers of military incursions into Taiwanese airspace and large-scale naval drills continue to signal that “reunification” – by force if necessary – remains the CCP’s goal.
China has shown no signs of moderating its position and, in fact, seems to be leaning into it. Propaganda efforts targeting Taiwan’s populace are also expanding.
Taiwan’s defence leadership harbors no illusions about Beijing’s plans – it has stated bluntly that the threat from the Chinese regime is active, not theoretical.
By spending more, training harder, and mobilizing faster with U.S. support, Taiwan is sending Beijing the message that the cost of invasion would be neither easy nor cost-effective, and that the PLA would not be victorious.
In short, the free island nation intends to survive the storm as it prepares for the worst.
Which brings us back to our own ‘free island nation’, Australia. What exactly is the Albanese government doing – in the short term – about defence and national security in the event of a regional war that would almost certainly involve Australia?
The simple answer is … practically nothing!
There has been plenty of media posturing by Albanese, Marles and Wong but most of what they promise to do is many years into the future when it may well be too late.
In the meantime, they continue to promote their hope for “de-escalation and an end to all conflict” in the naïve belief that if everyone just settles down and acts nicely to each other, then all will be well in the world.
If only it was that simple!
If we want to remain a free island nation, we should be doing exactly what Taiwan is doing – but that’s clearly not going to happen with an Albanese government that is clearly set on appeasement.
Unless there is an urgent change in strategy, we will have to bear the consequences.
Originally published at Epoch Times and Richardson Post, where this article is published in full.